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Abstract. This paper presents a very simple and efficient adaptively-
sound perfect NIZK argument system for any NP-language. In contrast
to recently proposed schemes by Groth, Ostrovsky and Sahai, our scheme
does not pose any restriction on the statements to be proven. Besides,
it enjoys a number of desirable properties: it allows to re-use the com-
mon reference string (CRS), it can handle arithmetic circuits, and the
CRS can be set-up very efficiently without the need for an honest party.
We then show an application of our techniques in constructing efficient
NIZK schemes for proving arithmetic relations among committed secrets,
whereas previous methods required expensive generic NP-reductions.
The security of the proposed schemes is based on a strong
non-standard assumption, an extended version of the so-called
Knowledge-of-Exponent Assumption (KEA) over bilinear groups. We
give some justification for using such an assumption by showing that the
commonly-used approach for proving NIZK arguments sound does not al-
low for adaptively-sound statistical NIZK arguments (unless
NP ⊂ P/poly). Furthermore, we show that the assumption used in our
construction holds with respect to generic adversaries that do not exploit
the specific representation of the group elements. We also discuss how to
avoid the non-standard assumption in a pre-processing model.
1 Introduction
1.1 Background
Non-Interactive Zero-Knowledge (NIZK). The notion of NIZK captures
the problem of proving a statement by just sending one message and without
revealing any additional information besides the validity of the statement, pro-
vided that a common reference string (CRS) has been properly set up. Since
its introduction by Blum, Feldman and Micali in 1988 [7], NIZK has been a
fundamental cryptographic primitive used throughout modern cryptography in
essential ways.
There is a considerable amount of literature dedicated to NIZK, in particular
to the study of which languages allow for what flavor of NIZK proof. As in case
of interactive ZK it is well known that there cannot be statistical NIZK proofs
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(i.e., both ZK and soundness are unconditional) for NP-complete languages un-
less the polynomial hierarchy collapses [24,3,32]. Hence, when considering gen-
eral NP-languages, this only leaves room for a NIZK proof with computational
ZK or computational soundness (where the proof is also called an argument),
or both. However, in contrast to interactive ZK where it has long been known
that both flavors can exist [9,8,25], all proposed NIZK proofs or arguments for
general NP-languages have computational ZK (see e.g. [7,22,6,29,17]). Hence
the construction of a statistically NIZK (NISZK) argument has remained an
open problem (until very recently, see below). The question of the existence of
NISZK arguments is in particular interesting in combination with a result by
De Santis et al. [17], where they observe that for a strong notion of NIZK, called
same-string NIZK, soundness can only be computational when considering NP-
complete languages (assuming that one-way functions exist).
Statistical NIZK Arguments. Recently, Groth, Ostrovsky and Sahai pro-
posed an elegant construction for a perfect NIZK (NIPZK) argument for circuit-
SAT [26] by using bilinear groups. This shows NIZK can come with perfect ZK
for any NP-language. However, the scheme only provides security against a non-
adaptive dishonest prover who chooses the target instance x∗ ∈ L (for which it
wants to fake a proof) independent of the CRS. In an application though, it is
likely that the adversary first sees the CRS and then chooses the false statement
on which he wants to cheat. Using a counting argument, they argue that under
some strengthened assumption their scheme is secure against an adaptive dis-
honest prover if the size of the circuit to be proven is a-priori limited. However,
the bound on the size of the circuit is so restrictive that the circuit must be
smaller than sublinear in the bit size of the CRS (as discussed in Section 1.3).
Groth et al. also proposed a perfect NIZK argument for SAT which is provably
secure in Canetti’s Universal Composability (UC) framework [10]. However, be-
sides being much less efficient than their first construction, the scheme still does
not guarantee unrestricted security against an adaptive dishonest prover who
chooses the target instance x∗ ∈ L depending on the CRS. For instance, the UC
security does not exclude the possibility that a dishonest prover comes up with
an accepting proof for the statement “the CRS is invalid or S is true” for an
arbitrary false statement S. Since in a real-life execution the CRS is assumed
to be valid, this is a convincing argument of the false statement S. Accordingly,
the existence of an unrestricted statistical or perfect NIZK argument, which does
not pose any restriction on the instances to be proven, is still an open problem.
The Knowledge-of-Exponent Assumption. Informally, the Knowledge-of-
Exponent Assumption (kea) says that for certain groups, given a pair g and
gˆ = gx of group elements with unknown discrete-log x, the only way to efficiently
come up with another pair A and Aˆ such that Aˆ = Ax (for the same x) is by
raising g and gˆ to some power a: A = ga and Aˆ = gˆa. kea was first introduced
and used by Damg˚ard in 1991 [14], and later, together with an extended version
(kea2), by Hada and Tanaka [27]. Recently, Bellare and Palacio [5] showed that
kea2 does not hold, and proposed a new extended version called kea3 in order
to save Hada and Tanaka’s results. kea3, which we call xkea for eXtended kea,
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says that given two pairs (g, gˆ) and (h, hˆ) with the same unknown discrete-log x,
the only way to efficiently come up with another pair A and Aˆ such that Aˆ = Ax
is by computing A = gahα and Aˆ = gˆahˆα. Assumptions like kea and xkea
are widely criticized in particular because they do not appear to be “efficiently
falsifiable”, as Naor put it [30], though Bellare and Palacio showed that this is
not necessarily the case.
1.2 Our Result
Based on xkea over bilinear groups, we construct an adaptively-sound NIPZK
argument for circuit-SAT without any restrictions on the instances to be proven.
Besides being the first unrestricted adaptively-sound NISZK argument for any
NP-language, the proposed scheme enjoys a number of additional desirable prop-
erties: It is same-string NIZK, which allows to re-use the CRS. It is very efficient:
the CRS essentially consists of a few group elements, and a proof consists of a
few group elements per multiplication gate; this is comparable (if not better)
to the first scheme by Groth et al., which is the most efficient general-purpose
NIZK scheme known up to date (see the comparison in [26]). Furthermore, our
scheme can also be applied to arithmetic circuits over Zq for a large prime q
whereas known schemes are tailored to binary circuits; this often allows a more
compact representation of the statement to be proven. Finally, the CRS does
not need to be set-up by a trusted party. It can efficiently be set-up jointly by
the prover and the verifier. Furthermore, it can even be provided solely from a
(possibly dishonest) verifier without any correctness proof if we view the proof
system as a zap [21] rather than a NIZK. We are not aware of any other NIZK
arguments or proofs that enjoy all these desirable properties.
Based on the techniques developed for the perfect NIZK argument for SAT,
we also construct an efficient NIPZK argument for arithmetic relations among
committed secrets over Zq with large prime q. To the best of our knowledge, all
known schemes only work for secrets from restricted domains such as Z2 and
have to rely on generic inefficient reductions to NP-complete problems to handle
larger secrets. Our approach in particular allows for additive and multiplicative
relations among secrets committed to by standard Pedersen commitments.
We give two justifications for using such a strong non-standard assumption
like xkea. First, we prove that kea and xkea hold in the generic group model
(even over bilinear groups). This suggests that if there exists an algorithm that
breaks, say, kea in a certain group, then this algorithm must use the specific rep-
resentation of the elements of that group, and it is likely to fail when some other
group (representation) is used. A similar result was independently developed by
Dent [20] for non-bilinear groups. Second, we give some indication that a non-
standard assumption is unavoidable for adaptively-sound NISZK arguments. We
prove that the common approach for proving computational soundness, which
has been used for all NIZK arguments (we are aware of), does not allow for
statistical ZK unless NP ⊂ P/poly (i.e. unless any NP-problem can be solved by
an efficient non-uniform algorithm). Due to lack of space, this result is moved
to the full version of this paper [1].
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Finally, we discuss how to avoid xkea in our NIZK arguments by allowing
a pre-processing phase. Our scheme allows very efficient pre-processing where
the prover only needs to make commitments for random values and prove their
knowledge using efficient off-the-shelf zero-knowledge schemes.
1.3 Related Work
In order to make it easier for the reader to position our results, we would like
to give a brief discussion about recently proposed NIPZK arguments. In [26]
Groth et al. presented two schemes for proving circuit satisfiability, where the
first one comes in two flavors. Let us name the resulting three schemes by the
non-adaptive, the adaptive and the UC GOS scheme. These are the first (and so
far only) NISZK arguments proposed in the literature. The non-adaptive GOS
scheme is admitted by the authors to be not adaptively sound. The adaptive
GOS scheme is adaptively sound, but it only allows for circuits that are limited
in size, and the underlying computational assumption is somewhat non-standard
in that it requires that some problem can only be solved with “sub-negligible”
probability, like 2−κ
 log κnegl(κ) where κ is the bit size of the problem instance.
The more one relaxes the bound on the size of the circuits, the stronger the
underlying assumption gets in terms of the assumed bound on the success prob-
ability of solving the problem; but in any case the size of the circuits are doomed
to be sub-linear in the size of the CRS.
Concerning the UC GOS scheme, we first would like to point out that it is of
theoretical interest, but it is very inefficient (though poly-time). Furthermore,
it has some tricky weak soundness property in that if a dishonest prover should
succeed in proving a false statement, then the statement cannot be distinguished
from a true one. It is therefore claimed in [26] that the scheme “achieves a weaker,
but sufficient, form of adaptive security.” This is true but only if some care is
taken with the kind of statements that the (dishonest) prover is allowed to prove;
in particular, soundness is only guaranteed if the statement to be proven does
not incorporate the CRS. Indeed, the same example that the authors use to
reason that their first scheme is not adaptively sound can also be applied to the
UC secure scheme: Consider a dishonest prover that comes up with an accepting
proof for the statement “the CRS is invalid”, or for a statement like “the CRS is
invalid or S is true” where S is an arbitrary false statement. In real-life, where
the CRS is guaranteed to be correct, this convinces the verifier of the truth of
the false statement S. would expect such a dishonest prover to be ruled out.
However, such a prover is not ruled out by the UC security: the simulator given
in [26] does generate an invalid CRS so that the statement in fact becomes true;
and thus the proof can obviously be simulated in the ideal-world (when given a
corresponding witness, which the simulator has in case of the UC GOS scheme).
We stress that this is not a flaw in the UC GOS scheme but it is the UC se-
curity definition that does not provide any security guarantees for statements
that incorporate the CRS, essentially because in the ideal-life model there is no
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(guaranteed-to-be-correct) CRS.1 This issue is addressed in a recent extension
of the UC framework [11].
In conclusion, UC NIZK security provides good enough security under the
condition that the statements to be proven do not incorporate the CRS. This
is automatically guaranteed in a UC setting, where the statements to be proven
must make sense in the ideal-world model, but not necessarily in other settings.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Notation
We consider uniform probabilistic algorithms (i.e. Turing machines) which take
as input (the unary encoding of) a security parameter κ ∈ N and possibly
other inputs and run in deterministic poly-time in κ. We thus always implicitly
require the size of the input to be bounded by some polynomial in κ. Adversarial
behavior is modeled by non-uniform poly-time probabilistic algorithms, i.e., by
algorithms which together with the security parameter κ also get some poly-
size auxiliary input auxκ. In order to simplify notation, we usually leave the
dependency on κ (and on auxκ) implicit. By y ← A(x), we mean that algorithm
A is executed on input x (and the security parameter κ and, in the non-uniform
case, auxκ) and the output is assigned to y. Similarly, for any finite set S, we use
the notation y ← S to denote that y is sampled uniformly from S, and y ← x
means that the value x is assigned to y.
For two algorithms A and B, A‖B denotes the joint execution of A and B on
the same input and the same random tape, and we write (x; y) ← (A‖B)(w) to
express that in the joint execution on input w (and the same random tape) A’s
output is assigned to x and B’s to y. Furthermore, P [ y = A(x) ] denotes the
probability (taken over the uniformly distributed random tape) that A outputs
y on input x, and we write P
[
x ← B : A(x) = y ] for the (average) probability
that A outputs y on input x when x is output by B: P [x ← B : A(x) = y ] =∑
x P
[
y = A(x) ]P [ x = B ]. We also use natural self-explanatory extensions of
this notation.
An oracle algorithm A is an algorithm in the above sense connected to an
oracle in that it can write on its own tape an input for the oracle and tell the
oracle to execute, and then, in a single step, the oracle processes its input in a
prescribed way, and writes its output to the tape. We write AO when we consider
A to be connected to the particular oracle O.
1 A minor flaw regarding the UC GOS scheme though is that Groth et al. claim the
scheme to be non-malleable, and their UC NIZK functionality indeed does guarantee
non-malleability in that a proof cannot be transformed into a different proof for the
same instance without knowing a witness. But it is easy to see that the UC GOS
scheme is not non-malleable, because the NIZK proof π generated at step 6. in
Figure 4 (by using the non-adaptive GOS scheme) is malleable: it uses the NIZK
proof from Figure 1 (with h of order n though) which is malleable by raising π1 and
π3 to some power s ∈ Z∗n and π2 to power s−1 (mod n).
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As is common practice, a value ν(κ) ∈ R, which depends on the security
parameter κ, is called negligible, denoted by ν(κ) ≤ negl(κ) or ν ≤ negl, if
∀ c > 0 ∃κ◦ ∈ N ∀κ ≥ κ◦ : ν(κ) < 1/κc. Furthermore, ν(κ) ∈ R is called
noticeable if ∃ c > 0, κ◦ ∈ N ∀κ ≥ κ◦ : ν(κ) ≥ 1/κc.
2.2 Definition
Let L ⊆ {0, 1}∗ be an NP-language.
Definition 1. Consider poly-time algorithms G, P and V of the following form:
G takes the security parameter κ (implicitly treated hereafter) and outputs a
common reference string (CRS) Σ together with a trapdoor τ . P takes as input
a CRS Σ and an instance x ∈ L together with an NP-witness w and outputs a
proof π. V takes as input a CRS Σ, an instance x and a proof π and outputs
1 or 0. The triple (G,P ,V) is a statistical/perfect NIZK argument for L if the
following properties hold.
Completeness: For any x ∈ L with corresponding NP-witness w
P
[
(Σ, τ) ← G, π ← P(Σ, x,w) : V(Σ, x, π) = 0 ] ≤ negl .
Soundness: For any non-uniform poly-time adversary P∗
P
[
(Σ, τ) ← G, (x∗, π∗) ← P∗(Σ) : x∗ ∈ L ∧ V(Σ, x∗, π∗) = 1 ] ≤ negl .
Statistical/Perfect Zero-Knowledge (ZK): There exists a poly-time simulator S
such that for any instance x ∈ L with NP-witness w, and for (Σ, τ) ← G,
π ← P(Σ, x,w) and πsim ← S(Σ, τ, x), the joint distributions of (Σ, π) and
(Σ, πsim) are statistically/perfectly close.
Remark 2. The notion of soundness we use here guarantees security against an
adaptive attacker, which may choose the instance x∗ depending on the CRS.
We sometimes emphasize this issue by using the term adaptively-sound. Note
that this is a strictly stronger notion than when the adversary must choose x∗
independent of the CRS.
Remark 3. In the notion of ZK we use here, P and S use the same CRS string.
In [17], this is called same-string ZK. In the context of statistical ZK, this notion
is equivalent (and not only sufficient) to unbounded ZK,which captures that the
same CRS can be used an unbounded number of times. This is obviously much
more desirable compared to the original notion of NIZK, where every proof
requires a fresh CRS. In [17], it is shown that there cannot be a same-string
NIZK proof with statistical soundness for a NP-complete language unless there
exist no one-way functions. This makes it even more interesting to find out
whether there exists a same-string NIZK argument with statistical security on
at least one side, namely the ZK side.
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2.3 Bilinear Groups and the Hardness Assumptions
We use the standard setting of bilinear groups. Let BGG be a bilinear-group gen-
erator that (takes as input the security parameter κ and) outputs (G,H, q, g, e)
where G and H is a pair of groups of prime order q, g is a generator of G, and e is
a non-degenerate bilinear map e : G×G → H, meaning that e(ga, gb) = e(g, g)ab
for any a, b ∈ Zq and e(g, g) = 1H.
We assume the Discrete-Log Assumption, dla, that for a random h ∈ G it
is hard to compute w ∈ Zq with h = gw. In some cases, we also assume the
Diffie-Hellman Inversion Assumption, dhia, which states that, for a random
h = gw ∈ G, it is hard to compute g1/w. Formally, these assumptions for a
bilinear-group generator BGG are stated as follows. In order to simplify notation,
we abbreviate the output (G,H, q, g, e) of BGG by pub (for “public parameters”).
Assumption 4 (dla). For every non-uniform poly-time algorithm A
P
[
pub ← BGG, h ← G, w ← A(pub, h) : gw = h ] ≤ negl .
Assumption 5 (dhia). For every non-uniform poly-time algorithm A
P
[
pub ← BGG, h ← G, g1/w ← A(pub, h) : gw = h ] ≤ negl .
Furthermore, we assume xkea, a variant of the Knowledge-of-Exponent As-
sumption kea, (referred to as kea3 respectively kea1 in [5]). kea informally
states that given gˆ = gx ∈ G with unknown discrete-log x, the only way to
efficiently come up with a pair A, Aˆ ∈ G such that Aˆ = Ax for the same x is
by choosing some a ∈ Zq and computing A = ga and Aˆ = gˆa. xkea states that
given gˆ = gx ∈ G as well as another pair h and hˆ = hx with the same unknown
discrete-log x, the only way to efficiently come up with a pair A, Aˆ such that
Aˆ = Ax is by choosing a, α ∈ Zq and computing A = gahα and Aˆ = gˆahˆα. For-
mally, kea and xkea are phrased by assuming that for every algorithm which
outputs A and Aˆ as required, there exists an extractor which outputs a (and α
in case of xkea) when given the same input and randomness.
Assumption 6 (kea). For every non-uniform poly-time algorithm A there ex-
ists a non-uniform poly-time algorithm XA, the extractor, such that
P
[
pub←BGG, x←Zq , (A, Aˆ; a)←(A‖XA)(pub, gx) : Aˆ=Ax ∧ A =ga
] ≤ negl .
Recall that (A, Aˆ; a) ← (A‖XA)(pub, gx) means that A and XA are executed
on the same input (pub, gx) and the same random tape, and A outputs (A, Aˆ)
whereas XA outputs a.
Assumption 7 (xkea). For every non-uniform poly-time algorithm A there
exists a non-uniform poly-time algorithm XA, the extractor, such that
P
[
pub ← BGG, x ← Zq, h ← G,
(A, Aˆ; a, α) ← (A‖XA)(pub, gx, h, hx)
: Aˆ = Ax ∧ A = gahα
]
≤ negl .
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It is well known that dla holds provably with respect to generic algorithms
(see e.g. [34]), which operate on the group elements only by applying the group
operations (multiplication and inversion), but do not make use of the specific
representation of the group elements. It is not so hard to see that this result
extends to groups G that come with a bilinear pairing e : G × G → H, i.e., to
generic algorithms that are additionally allowed to apply the pairing and the
group operations in H. We prove in Section 5 that also kea and xkea hold with
respect to generic algorithms.
We would also like to point out that we only depend on xkea for “proof-
technical” reasons: our perfect NIZK argument still appears to be secure even
if xkea should turn out to be false (for the particular generator BGG used),
but we cannot prove it anymore formally. This is in contrast to how kea and
xkea are used in [27] respectively [5] for 3-round ZK, where there seems to be
no simulator anymore as soon as kea is false.
3 A Perfect NIZK Argument for SAT
3.1 Handling Multiplication Gates
Let (G,H, q, g, e) be generated by BGG, as described in Section 2.3 above. Fur-
thermore, let h = gw for a random w ∈ Zq which is unknown to anybody.
Consider a prover who announces an arithmetic circuit over Zq and who wants
to prove in NIZK that there is a satisfying input for it. Following a standard
design principle, where the prover commits to every input value using Peder-
sen’s commitment scheme with “basis” g and h as well as to every intermediate
value of the circuit when evaluating it on the considered input, the problem re-
duces to proving the consistency of the multiplication gates in NIZK (whereas
the addition gates come for free due to the homomorphic property of Pedersen’s
commitment scheme).
Concretely, though slightly informally, given commitments A = gahα, B =
gbhβ and C = gchγ for values a, b and c ∈ Zq, respectively, the prover needs to
prove in NIZK that c = a · b. Note that
e(A,B) = e(gahα, gbhβ) = e(g, g)ab e(g, h)aβ+αb e(h, h)αβ and
e(C, g) = e(gchγ , g) = e(g, g)c e(g, h)γ
and hence, if indeed c = a · b, then
e(A,B)/e(C, g) = e(g, h)aβ+αb−γ e(h, h)αβ = e(gaβ+αb−γhαβ , h) . (1)
Say that, in order to prove that c = a ·b, the prover announces P = gaβ+αb−γhαβ
and the verifier accepts if and only if P is satisfying in that
e(A,B)/e(C, g) = e(P, h) .
Then, by the above observations it is immediate that an honest verifier accepts
the correct proof of an honest prover. Also, it is quite obvious that a simulator
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which knows w can “enforce” c = a · b by “cheating” with the commitments, and
thus perfectly simulate a satisfying P for the multiplication gate. Note that the
simulator needs to know some opening of the commitments in order to simulate
P ; this though is good enough for our purpose. For completeness, though, we
address this issue again in Section 4 and show a version which allows a full-
fledged simulation. Finally, it appears to be hard to come up with a satisfying
P unless one can indeed open A, B and C to a, b and c such that c = a · b.
Concretely, the following holds.
Lemma 8. Given openings of A, B and C to a, b and c, respectively, with
c = a · b, and given an opening of a satisfying P , one can efficiently compute w.
Proof. Let P = gρh be the given opening of P . Then, inheriting the notation
from above,
e(A,B)/e(C, g) = e(gahα, gbhβ)/e(gchγ , g) = e(g, g)ab−ce(g, h)aβ+αb−γe(h, h)αβ.
and
e(A,B)/e(C, g) = e(P, h) = e(gρh, h) = e(g, h)ρ e(h, h)
are two different representations of the same element in H with respect to the
“basis” e(g, g), e(g, h) = e(g, g)w, e(h, h) = e(g, g)w
2
. This allows to compute w
by solving a quadratic equation in Zq. unionsq
The need for an opening of P can be circumvented by basing security on dhia
rather than dla as stated in the following lemma.
Lemma 9. Given openings of A, B and C to a, b and c, respectively, with
c = a · b, and given a satisfying P , one can efficiently compute g1/w.
Proof. For a satisfying P it holds that
e(P, h) = e(A,B)/e(C, g) = e(g, g)ab−c e(g, h)aβ+bα−γ e(h, h)αβ
and thus, when c = a · b as assumed, the following equalities follow one after the
other.
e(g, g) = e
(
(P g−aβ−bα+γh−αβ)1/(ab−c), h
)
e(g1/w, g) = e
(
(P g−aβ−bα+γh−αβ)1/(ab−c), g
)
g1/w = (P g−aβ−bα+γh−αβ)1/(ab−c)
Thus, g1/w can be computed from the available information. unionsq
It remains to argue that a (successful) prover can indeed open all the necessary
commitments. This can be enforced as follows. Instead of committing to every
value s by S = gshσ, the prover has to commit to s by S = gshσ and Sˆ = gˆshˆσ,
where gˆ = gx for a random x ∈ Zq and hˆ = hx (with the same x). Note that
the same randomness σ is used for computing S and Sˆ, such that Sˆ = Sx; this
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can be verified using the bilinear map: e(Sˆ, g) = e(S, gˆ). xkea now guarantees
that for every correct double commitment (S, Sˆ) produced by the prover, he
knows (respectively there exists an algorithm that outputs) s and σ such that
S = gshσ.
Based on the above observations, we construct and prove secure an adaptively-
sound perfect NIZK argument for circuit-SAT in the next section.
3.2 The Perfect NIZK Scheme
The NIZK scheme for circuit-SAT is given in Figure 1. Note that we assume an
arithmetic circuit C over Zq (rather than a binary circuit), but of course it is
standard to “emulate” a binary circuit by an arithmetic one.
CRS Generator G(1κ) :
G-1. (G, H, q, g, e) ← BGG(1κ), w ← Zq , gˆ ← G, h ← gw, hˆ ← gˆw,
G-2. output Σ ← (G, H, q, g, h, gˆ, hˆ, e) and τ ← w.
Prover P(Σ,C, x = (x1, . . . , xn)
)
:
P-1. Compute commitments for every input xi by Xi = gxihξi and Xˆi = gˆxi hˆξi .
P-2. Inductively, for every multiplication gate in C for which the two input values a
and b are committed upon (either directly or indirectly via the homomorphic
property) by A = gahα and Aˆ = gˆahˆα respectively B = gbhβ and Bˆ =
gˆbhˆβ, do the following. Compute a (double) commitment C = gchγ and
Cˆ = gˆchˆγ for the corresponding output value c = a · b, and compute the
(double) commitment P = gaβ+αb−γhαβ and Pˆ = gˆaβ+αb−γhˆαβ .
P-3. As proof π output all the commitments as well as the randomness η for the
commitment Y = gC(x)hη for the output value C(x) = 1.
Verifier V(Σ,C, π):
Output 1 (i.e. “accept”) if all of the following holds, otherwise output 0.
V-1. Every double commitment (S; Sˆ) satisfies e(Sˆ, g) = e(S, gˆ).
V-2. Every multiplication gate in C, with associated (double) commitments (A, Aˆ),
(B, Bˆ), (C, Cˆ) and (P, Pˆ ) for the two input values, the output value and the
“multiplication proof”, satisfies e(A,B)/e(C, g) = e(P, h).
V-3. The commitment Y for the output value satisfies Y = g1hη.
Fig. 1. Perfect NIZK argument for circuit-SAT
Theorem 10. (G,P ,V) from Fig. 1 is an adaptively-sound perfect NIZK argu-
ment for circuit-SAT, assuming xkea and dla.
Proof. Completeness is straightforward using observation (1). Also, perfect ZK
is easy to see. Indeed, the simulator S can run P with a default input for x, say
o = (0, . . . , 0), and then simply open the commitment Y for the output value
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y = C(o) (which is likely to be different from 1) to 1 using the trapdoor w.
Since Pedersen’s commitment scheme is perfectly hiding, and since P and Pˆ
computed in step P-2. for every multiplication gate are uniquely determined by
A, B, and C, it is clear that this simulation is perfectly indistinguishable from
a real execution of P .
It remains to argue soundness. Assume there exists a dishonest poly-time
prover P∗, which on input the CRS Σ outputs a circuit C∗ together with a
proof π∗ such that with non-negligible probability, C∗ is not satisfiable but
V(Σ,C∗, π∗) outputs 1. By xkea, there exists a poly-time extractor XP∗ such
that when run on the same CRS and the same random tape as P∗, the extrac-
tor XP∗ outputs the opening information for all (double) commitments in the
proof with non-negligible probability.2 Concretely, for every multiplication gate
and the corresponding commitments A, B, C and P , the extractor XP∗ outputs
a, α, b, β, c, γ, ρ, such that A = gahα, B = gbhβ , C = gchγ and P = gρh. If
P∗ succeeds in forging a proof for an unsatisfiable circuit, then there obviously
must be an inconsistent multiplication gate with inputs a and b and output
c = a · b. (Note that since addition gates are processed using the homomorphic
property, there cannot be an inconsistency in an addition gate.) But this con-
tradicts dla by Lemma 8. unionsq
Remark 11. The NIZK argument from Fig. 1 actually provides adaptive ZK,
which is a stronger flavor of ZK than guaranteed by Definition 1. It guarantees
that S cannot only perfectly simulate a proof π for any circuit C, but when later
given a satisfying input x for C, it can also provide the randomness that explains
how π could have been generated by running P on witness x.
Remark 12. It is reasonable to assume that one can efficiently verify that, for
given (G,H, q, g, e), G and H are groups of order q, g generates G, and e is a
non-degenerate bilinear map. Then, the CRS Σ = (G,H, q, g, h, gˆ, hˆ, e) may be
generated by the (possibly dishonest) verifier, together with an (interactive) ZK
proof of the knowledge of w with gw = h, which can be done very efficiently
by using the 4-round ZK proof from [13] for instance. The prover additionally
needs to check if e(gˆ, h) = e(g, hˆ). Hence, the set-up of the CRS requires no
honest party nor any expensive 2-party (or multi-party) computation. If the
proof of knowledge of w is omitted, so that the verifier only publishes the CRS
Σ, then the argument is still witness indistinguishable. Thus, our scheme can
also be appreciated as a (computationally sound) zap [21].
Remark 13. By omitting Pˆ (and the corresponding verifications), one can obtain
a slightly more efficient protocol based on the possibly stronger assumption dhia
instead of dla. The security can be proven in exactly the same way based on
2 As a matter of fact, xkea guarantees that for every double commitment there exists
an extractor that outputs the opening for that particular commitment with non-
negligible probability; but of course running all these extractors together allows to
extract for all commitments simultaneously with non-negligible probability (since
the size of C must be polynomially bounded).
Perfect NIZK with Adaptive Soundness 129
Lemma 9 instead of Lemma 8. Furthermore, if one is willing to trade xkea by
a new assumption (though of similar flavor, but which can also be proven in the
generic model) that the only way to come up with A, B, C and P such that
e(A,B)/e(C, g) = e(P, h) is by choosing A, B and C as commitments of a, b and
c = a · b, respectively, then one can get a NIZK scheme where (not counting the
unavoidable commitments A, B and C) the proof for each multiplication gate
consists of only 1 group element, P . Note that this requires less communication
than using standard interactive ZK techniques in combination with the Fiat-
Shamir heuristic [23].
4 Efficient Proof for Relations Among Commitments
We again consider the problem of proving that a Pedersen commitment C = gchγ
“contains” the product c = a · b of a and b committed to by A = gahα re-
spectively B = gbhβ. Recall that the multiplication proof discussed in Sec-
tion 3.1, consisting of P such that e(A,B)/e(C, g) = e(P, h) (and maybe the
corresponding Pˆ ), can only be simulated if the simulator knows some open-
ings of A, B and C. This was good enough for the application to NIZK for
SAT, as in this case all commitments may be prepared by the simulator. How-
ever, for other applications, it might be desirable to have a similarly efficient
non-interactive multiplication proof which allows a fully-fledged simulation, i.e.,
which can be simulated for any given A, B and C. We show in this section
a modification of the multiplication proof of Section 3.1 which has this
property.
The setting is the same as in the previous section; We assume that a CRS
Σ = (G,H, q, g, h, gˆ, hˆ, e) has been properly set up and is publicly available. Per
default, the prover is required to provide Aˆ, Bˆ and Cˆ for the commitments A,
B and C in question, and the verifier should check if e(gˆ, A) = e(g, Aˆ) etc., so
that the opening of A, B and C can be extracted via xkea. Note that such
Aˆ, Bˆ and Cˆ can be computed from A, B and C and x = logg gˆ ∈ Zq. Thus,
the ZK simulator who knows x can simulate Aˆ, Bˆ and Cˆ without knowing the
openings of the original commitments. For ease of description, these “hatted”
commitments and corresponding verifications are treated implicitly hereafter. We
begin with a simple relation for proving that a commitment A can be opened to
zero.
Open to Zero (a = 0): For A = g0hα, the prover publishes P = gα. The
verifier accepts if e(g,A) = e(h, P ).
It is obvious that an honest verifier accepts the correct proof of an honest prover.
ZK is straightforward: the simulator who knows w can compute P = A1/w
(without knowing the opening of A). Finally, given an opening (a, α) of A and
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a satisfying P , i.e., such that e(g,A) = e(h, P ), if a = 0 then one can efficiently
compute g1/w. This follows from the following equalities:
e(g, gahα) = e(h, P )
e(g, ga) = e(g, Pg−α)w
e(g, g1/w) = e(g, (Pg−α)1/a)
and thus g1/w = (Pg−α)1/a.
The above protocol for opening to zero can be easily applied to show equality
(a = b) and addition (a+ b = c) by replacing A in the above protocol with A/B
and AB/C, respectively.
We next show a proof system for multiplicative relation a · b = c. Recall that
the goal is to have a multiplication proof which allows a simulation for any A,
B and C given to the simulator.
Multiplication (ab = c): The prover publishes P = (R,S, T ) such that R =
hr, S = gr for random r and T = gaβ+αb−γ−arhαβ−αr. The verifier accepts
if e(g,R) = e(h, S) and e(A,B)/e(g, C) = e(A,R)e(h, T ).
Completeness is verified by seeing that the first verification equation follows from
e(g,R) = e(g, hr) = e(gr, h) = e(h, S), and the second from e(A,B)/e(g, C) =
e(g, g)ab−c e(g, h)aβ+αb−γ e(h, h)αβ in combination with
e(A,R) e(h, T ) = e(gahα, hr) e(h, gaβ+αb−γ−arhαβ−αr)
= e(ga, hr) e(hα, hr) e(h, gaβ+αb−γ−ar) e(h, hαβ−αr)
= e(g, h)aβ+αb−γ e(h, h)αβ ,
which gives the desired equality if indeed ab − c = 0.
Fully-fledged ZK and soundness are captured by following Lemma 14 and 15,
respectively.
Lemma 14. Given A, B and C, one can efficiently simulate random R, S and
T such that e(g,R) = e(h, S) and e(A,B)/e(g, C) = e(A,R)e(h, T ).
Proof. Given the trapdoor w, the simulator picks random u and sets R = Bhu,
S = R1/w, and T = A−uC−1/w. As in the real proof, (S,R, T ) is uniformly
distributed subject to the verification equations:
e(h, S) = e(h,R1/w) = e(g,R)
and
e(A,R) e(h, T ) = e(A,Bhu) e(h,A−uC−1/w)
= e(A,B) e(Au, h) e(h,A−u) e(g, C−1)
= e(A,B)/e(g, C) .
Thus, the simulation is perfect. unionsq
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Lemma 15. Given openings of A, B and C to a, b and c, respectively, with
c = a · b, and given a satisfying P = (R,S, T ), one can efficiently compute g1/w.
Proof. We first observe that R and S constitute a proof of zero-opening. Hence
we can say that R = hr for some r. Furthermore, we can extract such r by
applying xkea to R and S since they are in correct relation verified by e(g,R) =
e(h, S). Now, for a, α, b, β, c, γ and r, we see the following holds from the second
verification equation:
e(A,B)/e(g, C) = e(A,R) e(h, T )
e(gahα, gbhβ) e(g, g−ch−γ) = e(gahα, R) e(h, T )
e(g, gab−c) = e(h, g−aβ−αb+ra+γh−αβRαT )
e(g, g1/w) = e(g, g−aβ−αb+ra+γh−αβRαT )1/(ab−c)
Therefore, if ab = c, one can compute g1/w = (g−aβ−αb+ra+γh−αβRαT )1/(ab−c),
which contradicts to dhia. unionsq
Now, we need to discuss what kind of NIZK arguments these protocols for-
mally are. The crucial issue stems from the fact that Pedersen’s commitment
scheme is unconditionally hiding and thus the language of all triples (A,B,C)
which allow an opening with a · b = c is trivial. Therefore, proving a statement
among these commitments only makes sense in terms of proof of knowledge. By
Lemma 15, the “knowledge soundness” can be proven by using the extractor of
xkea as knowledge extractor. Accordingly, the quality of the extractor of xkea
immediately affects to the quality of the knowledge extractor. Since xkea only
provides a non-black-box extractor, the best the protocol can achieve is a proof
of knowledge characterized by a non-black-box knowledge extractor.
Let R be a binary poly-time relation, which we allow to depend on (κ and)
Σ in order to capture schemes that prove something about commitments with
“basis” g and h, which are part of the CRS. Let LR = {x | ∃w : (x,w) ∈ R} be
the language characterized by R.
Definition 16. A NIZK proof of knowledge for R is a NIZK proof (or argu-
ment) for LR such that additionally for every non-uniform poly-time prover P∗
there exists a non-uniform poly-time extractor EP∗ such that
P
[
(Σ, τ)←G,
(x∗, π∗;w∗)←(P∗‖EP∗)(Σ) : (x
∗, w∗) ∈R ∧ V(Σ, x∗, π∗)=1
]
≤ negl .
Such NIZK proof of knowledge with non-black-box extractor might be weaker
than the one with universal black-box extractor originally defined in [19]. This
issue is analogue to black-box vs non-black-box ZK where both definitions are
widely accepted. Although a stronger definition is in general favorable, a weaker
definition has potential to capture nicer schemes with weaker assumptions or
even schemes that are impossible otherwise, but still guarantees sufficient
security.
The following now follows immediately from the above lemmas.
132 M. Abe and S. Fehr
Theorem 17. The above scheme gives a perfect NIZK proof of knowledge for
Rmult =
{(
(A,B,C), (a, α, b, β, γ)
) ∈ G3×Z5q
∣∣A = gahα, B = gbhβ, C = gabhγ
}
under xkea and dhia.
Finally, we note that all the statements in this section can be strengthened to
be based on dla rather than dhia by additionally providing Pˆ = (Rˆ, Sˆ, Tˆ ),
similarly as for the proof of SAT in Section 3.
5 The Security of (X)KEA Against Generic Attacks
The notion of a generic algorithm is due to Nechaev [31] and Shoup [34], where
it was shown that the discrete-log problem is hard for generic algorithms. In-
formally, a generic algorithm for trying to solve some DL-related problem in a
group G is one that does not exploit and thus does not depend on the actual
encoding of the group elements, but only relies on the group structure (and
that the encoding is injective). In our context, where G allows a bilinear map
e : G×G → H, we also allow the algorithm to make use of the bilinear map and
the group structure in H.
Formally, a generic algorithm for a bilinear group is an oracle algorithm A
which takes as input a prime q, encodings of elements of Zq with respect to a ran-
dom injective encoding function σ : Zq → S, and possibly encodings of elements
of Zq with respect to another random encoding function τ : Zq → T (with finite
S, T ⊂ {0, 1}∗). Furthermore, A is allowed to make oracle queries in order to
compute on encoded group elements: upon a query
(
add in G, sign, σ(y), σ(z)
)
the oracle O replies by σ(y+(−1)signz) and upon (add in H, sign, τ(y), τ(z)) by
τ
(
y+(−1)signz), and upon (pair, σ(y), σ(z)) the oracle replies by τ(y ·z). Note
that the add-queries model the group operations in G and H, and the pair-query
models the pairing e : G × G → H.
Interestingly, in the literature a generic algorithm A is typically only allowed
to query the oracle on encodings that it has received either as input or as a reply
to one of the previous queries, but it is not allowed to take such an encoding
and, say, flip the last bit and query the oracle on that encoding. Sometimes
(but not always), this is argued by letting the set of encodings (here S and T )
be so large that essentially any such query would be invalid anyway. But this
also implies that A cannot sample random group elements without “knowing”
their discrete-log. We do not want to make such a restriction, in particular in the
context of kea; even though such a step does not appear to be beneficial, we still
feel it should be taken care off in a rigorous analysis. In order to avoid having to
deal with invalid encodings, we assume that S = T = Zq (actually, the natural
representation of Zq as strings) and that A queries O only on valid encodings,
meaning strings in Zq. In some sense this models groups whose elements can be
efficiently recognized.
Theorem 18. The assumptions kea and xkea over bilinear groups hold with
respect to generic algorithms (as long as 1/q is negligible).
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Note that the generic security of kea in the standard (rather than the bilinear)
group setting was concurrently and independently shown by Dent [20].
Proof. Let us first consider kea. A generic algorithm A takes as input σ(1) and
σ(x) for a random x ∈ Zq, and it should output σ(a) and σ(ax) for some a ∈ Zq.
Let m be the (polynomial) number of oracle queries A makes. It is easy to see that
any encoding that A might use (or receive) in an oracle query or that A might
output is of the form σ
(
Pk(x, u1, . . . , u2m)
)
respectively τ
(
Qk(x, u1, . . . , u2m)
)
for multi-variate polynomials Pk ∈ Zq[X,U1, . . . , U2m] of total degree at most 1
respectively Qk ∈ Zq[X,U1, . . . , U2m] of total degree at most 2, and for random
(but fixed once and for all Pk and Qk) pairwise-different u1, . . . , u2m ∈ Zq \ {x}.
Indeed, σ(1) and σ(x) correspond to the polynomials 1 and X , every encoding
that A uses in a query which is fresh in that it has not been given to A in a
reply (or as input) corresponds to a new variable Ui, and any reply given by
the oracle corresponds to a Pk respectively Qk that is inductively computed as
Pk = Pi ± Pj respectively as Qk = Qi ± Qj or Qk = Pi · Pj . In particular, it
is easy to see that by observing A’s oracle queries, one can keep track of these
polynomials.
We now define the extractor XA as follows. XA runs A but keeps track of these
polynomials Pk and Qk; and if the two polynomials Pout◦ , Pout1 ∈ {Pk}k=1...m
that correspond to the two encodings that A outputs are of the form Pout◦ = a
and Pout1 = aX , then it outputs a and otherwise 0.
Let us analyze XA. Obviously, if XA fails (in that A outputs σ(a) and σ(ax)
but XA does not output a) then, by the restriction on the degree, Pout1 =
X ·Pout◦ , whereas Pout1 and X ·Pout◦ coincide when evaluated at (x, u1, . . . , u2m).
The event that XA fails is thus contained in the event E that at least two distinct
polynomials in {Pout1 , X ·Pout◦}, in {Pk}k=1...m or in {Qk}k=1...m evaluate to
the same value when applied to (x, u1, . . . , u2m). The standard argument for
analyzing generic algorithms, using Schwartz’ Lemma below, guarantees that
the probability of E is upper bounded by O(m2/q); since m is polynomial in κ,
this proves the claim (for kea).3
The proof for xkea uses exactly the same reasoning, the only difference
is that A gets four inputs, encodings of 1, x, w, xw ∈ Zq, which are associ-
ated with the polynomials 1, X,W,XW ∈ Zq[X,W,U1, . . . , U2m], and XA out-
puts a, α if Pout◦ is of the form Pout◦ = a + αW (which is the only Pout◦
which allows Pout1 = X · Pout◦). As above we can argue that if XA fails then
Pout1(x,w, u1, . . . , u2m) = x ·Pout◦(x,w, u1, . . . , u2m) but Pout1 = X ·Pout◦ . Rea-
3 To make the argument rigorous, one has to consider a modified “game” where A is
provided with random encodings as long as the corresponding polynomial (rather
than its evaluation) is new, and then observe that one can define a joint probabil-
ity distribution for the original and the modified game which leaves the individual
(marginal) distributions intact, and such that E occurs in the original game if and
only if it occurs in the modified one (and thus has the same probability in both cases).
In the modified game, however, the polynomials are chosen completely independent
of (x, u1, . . . , u2m) and thus we can apply Schwartz’ Lemma.
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soning as above, the probability of this to happen can again be upper bounded
by O(m2/q). unionsq
Lemma 19 (Schwartz [33]). Let q ∈ Z be a prime. For any polynomial P in
Zq[X1, . . . , Xn] of total degree at most d, the probability that P vanishes on a
uniformly distributed tuple (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ Znq is at most d/q.
6 Eliminating XKEA by Pre-processing
In this section, we briefly discuss the possibility of circumventing xkea, and
to solely rely on standard assumptions, by allowing pre-processing. Note that
in all of the above results, xkea is only needed in order to extract openings
of commitments that are prepared by the possibly dishonest player. There-
fore, a possible way to circumvent xkea is to have all players prepare in a
pre-processing phase random commitments U = guhν in such a way that one
can extract the openings (u, ν) of these commitments in the security proof: for
instance in the 2-player setting by a standard interactive ZK proof of knowl-
edge (e.g. the 4-round ZK scheme from [13]), or in the multi-player setting with
dishonest minority by a simple Pedersen VSS sharing. Then, when the actual
NIZK argument needs to be executed, instead of providing for every commit-
ment S = gshσ its hatted version Sˆ = gˆshˆσ, for every commitment S = gshσ
the opening (s+ u, σ + ν) of SU is provided, where U is a fresh unused random
commitment from the pre-processing phase. This then obviously also allows to
extract s in the security proof as required. There are some feasibility results
about statistical NIZK arguments in the pre-processing model, cf. [18,28,15],
which rely only on general assumptions but require a complicated pre-processing
stage.
Beaver’s pre-processing techniques [4] can be applied in a straightforward way
to yield similarly efficient schemes as we do. However, this approach requires
the generation of random commitments with multiplicative relations in the pre-
processing phase, whereas with our techniques purely random commitments,
which are potentially easier to prepare, suffice. For instance in the multi-player
setting, this is known as the linear pre-processing model [16], and when the
number of players is small, using the techniques of [12], one can have a once-
and-for-all pre-processing stage that allows to produce an unbounded number of
pseudo-random commitments on the fly.
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